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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
1 OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ' 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
\ Case No. 
vs. \ 12480 
CLARK JAMES RED.FORD, 
Defendant-AppeUant. , 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of 
Section 76-30-3 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), making 
' a murder committed in the perpetration of a rape, Mur-
der in the First Degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the District Court in and for 
, Juab County, the Honorable James P. McCune pre-
siding, and found guilty of Murder in the First Degree. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays that the judgment of the lower 
Court be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
On Friday, October 10, 1969, the victim, Ann Ler. 
anger, left her place of employment, the Spanish Fork 
Bank, at approximately 6 :15 p.m. to return to her apart-
ment in Provo, Utah. She developed car trouble on the 
way and was stopped southbound on Interstate High· 
way 15 on the freeway overpass in the vicinity of the 
Spanish Fork exit. 
Two automobiles were observed stopped in the 
parking lane, one of which was identified as belonging 
to Ann Levanger by Highway Patrolman Ned Duel, at 
6 :45 p.m. on October 10, 1969, and the other car was 
later identified as being that of the Appellant. 
The victim's body was found 16 days later on Oc· 
tober 26, 1969, by one Gary V. Winkle, a school teacher 
who was looking for antique bottles in an abandoned 
mining town known as Silver City, located in Juab 
County ( T 720). One house remains in Silver City which 
had last been occupied by the Rowley family, a grand· 
mother of Appellant, and the body was found stomach 
down with a portion of her clothing around her throai 
with a stick inserted. The victim's shoes and purse were 
found a short distance from the body. 
2 
1 On October 10, 1969, the Appellant was in the 
I Stocker Club in the City of Springville, Utah County, 
Ner 1 
ial., \\'hich City is north of the location where the Levanger 
automobile was found. The Appellant was drinking beer 
and playing pool in the Stocker Club with Michael Bran-
agan. Michael Branagan was going to Ely, Nevada, to 
get married and the Appellant also discussed the possi-
er- bilities of marriage. Branagan and Appellant then agreed 
irk to meet in Grant's Lounge, a bar located in Spanish 
Fork, Ctah, at 7:00 p.m. on October 10, 1969. 1rt-
the 
The Appellant was later sighted on October 10, 
1h. 1 1 ' 1969, at approximate y 9 :30 p.m. trave ing west to east 
the 
on Highway 50 and 6 in Goshen, Utah, by one Barbara 
Branagan in the company of her husband, Michael Bran-
the agan. The Branagans followed the Appellant's vehicle 
ng and Barbara Branagan then got out of her husband's 
at car and into Appellant's vehicle in front of the house of 










Barbara Branagan, upon entering the Appellant's 
rehicle, observed that Appellant had what appeared to 
be a black eye and bruise on the left portion of his face, 
mud on his shoes and hands and further testified to mud 
on the interior of the Appellant's automobile. 
Appellant was in Harold's Club in Provo, Utah, 
where he met one Tony Jensen. Appellant left the Stock-
er Club in Springville to drive to Zale' s Jewelry in Pro-
ro, Utah, to buy wedding rings and upon discovering it 
lo be dosed, went to Harold's Club where he engaged 
3 
one Tony Jensen and others in a pool game at approxi. 
mately 7 :00 p.m. on the evening of October 10, 1969. 
Appellant and Tony Jensen left Harold's Club ana 
went to the Regal Bowling Lanes, also in Provo, to play 
pool. Jensen and Appellant got into a fight over mone;· 
owed by Jensen to Appellant and Appellant testified 
Jensen threw the cue ball, hitting Appellant in the left 
face. Appellant testified the fight continued in the alley 
and at its conclusion at or about 7 :30 or 7 :45 p.m., he 
left, driving to Reams Bargain Center where he pur-
chased some clothing and then drove to the Sage Inn 
where his mother was employed in Springville, Utah. He 
talked to his mother for ten minutes and left, driving to 
Goshen to pick up Kathy Palmer Wing in order to meet 
the Branagans for the wedding trip to Ely, Nevada. 
The State's evidence showed the Branagans, Ap· 
pellant, and Kathy Palmer Wing left the Twin Pines 
Cafe in Goshen, Utah, at approximately 9 :45 or 10:00 
p.m. on October IO, 1969, and drove west on Highway 
50 and 6 toward Ely, Nevada, arriving in Ely at I :30 
to I :45 a.m. on October I I, 1969. Enroute to Ely, the 
Appellant had inquired if it was snowing in the general 
vicinity of where the body was located. While in Ely, 
the Branagans were married, as was Appellant, and Ap-
pellant bought a pair of shoes and other personal iterns 
for him and his wife. He then threw the old shoes out of 
the car window ten miles East of Ely on the return trip. 
The disappearance of the victim was on the radio 
and television, and was being discussed by the occupants 
4 
of the vehicle. On the return trip, in the vicinity of Silver 
City, the Appellant said, "I did that, didn't we, Mike." 
During the course of interrogation in December, 1969, 




THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY AD.MI'l'TING EVIDENCE OF A 
PRIOR ASSAULT HY APPELLANT UPON A 
PERSON OTHER THAN THE VICTIM. 
The State, over objection by Appellant, admitted 
testimony of one Linda I vie ( T 1319-1341) concerning 
an incident which had occurred on October 9, 1969, in 
which the Appellant abducted Linda I vie at knife point, 
forcing her to walk to Appellant's vehicle at which time 
she broke and ran. The State made its first reference to 
this incident in the opening statement and it is interest-
ing to note that the State placed great significance on 
Linda I vie' s testimony by calling her as a witness imme-
diately prior to resting. 
The State's case was and is largely circumstantial. 
The identity of the perpetrator of the offense is the only 
significantly triable issue. To place Linda I vie' s testi-
mony at the end of the State's case, as opposed to the 
beginning when the Perigo ( T 594) and Jackson ( T 
6U) witnesses testified was to place greater emphasis 
5 
upon the nature of the testimony and increase its preju 
dicial impact. The State had abandoned identificatior 
many days earlier in the trial and Linda Ivie's testimom 
was not offered for its limited purpose of identification 
but simply to show that Appellant was some kind ol 
wicked man who made assaults upon women regularly 
Trial counsel objected to .Mrs. Ivie's testimony Ir 
entirety in a l\'Iotion to Supress which was overruled am 
then requested the trial judge to admonish the jury ol 
the limited purpose for which the State was permitte( 
to off er the testimony ( T 1317) . The trial judge the1 
made the following statement: 
... V\Tithe reference to the testimony to be giY 
en by the witness Linda I vie, this testimony 1 
being admitted by the Court for a limited pur 
pose. I think it would be proper for the Court 11 
state for your information ... that her testimon: 
will undoubtedlp concern another offense or a 
alleged unlawful act by the defendant. This i 
admitted by the Court only for the purpose o 
identity of the defendant and for a method o 
operation, as we say in the law, modus operand 
or the initial M initial 0 .... Now, I'll state tha 
again, that you are to consider the testimony on! 
as to the identity of the defendant, his presenc 
in the locality, and any method of operation o 
action on his part which you may consider fror 
the testimony of this witness. In any event, yo 
are not to consider this as any proof of anothe 
offense and simply for the purpose for which th 
Court has stated. 
Trial counsel renewed his objection to the testimony c 
6 
Linda I vie in total and excepted to the Court's admoni-
tion (T 1318). 
The effect of the Court's admonition was to permit 
the jury to consider Linda I vie' s testimony for whatever 
, they desired and was not limited to identification. Ap-
, pellant also urges the Court to note that Mrs. I vie' s 
testimony, in a very small part, was not restricted to iden-
tification but was rather testimony in detail regarding a 
separate substantive offense upon a victim not on trial 
and went greatly beyond any limitation to identification. 
The State's attorney, in closing argument, attempt-
ed to draw analogies to this incident and the case for 
which the Appellant was being tried by suggesting an 
1 attack by a man by use of force in a lonely place upon an 
unsuspecting female ( T 1823-1825). 
This type of flagrantly prejudicial testimony can 
1 never be cured by a cautionary instruction as was given. 
The general rule in Utah is expressed in State vs. 
Pollock, 129 P2d 554 ( 1924) by Justice "\Volfe, speak-
ing for the Court, quoting with approval from State vs. 
Morris, 90 Or. 60, 175 P 668, 670, as set out in State vs. 
Kappas, 100 Utah 274, 114 P2d 205: 
As a general rule, evidence of other crimes is not 
Uj admissable; but, where the evidence tends to show 
r
1 the commission of a system of crimes by unusual 
methods, it is admitted. 
The eYidence of other crimes, while often relevant 
lu show criminal propensities, the relevancy is out-
7 
weighed by the risks of undue influence on the jury ani 
raising collateral issues. Jones vs. Commonwealth, 30,J 
Ky 666. Exceptions to this general rule allow in evidenrt 
of prior crimes to establish some element of the present 
crime charged, as opposed to showing that the defend. 
ant had a criminal propensity. People vs. Puente, 28 Cal 
2d 306. Utah seems to have taken an absolute position ir1 
sex crimes such as Appellant was charged with here. 
Evidence of prior sex crimes or bad acts may bt 
admissable to show a passion or propensity for illicit sex· 
ual relations with the person concerned in the crime on~ 
trial. Hence, the prior crimes must involve the complain· 
ing witness. State vs. Williarns, 36 Utah 273, 103 P 250. 
Justice Henroid, speaking for a unanimous Court in 
reversing and granting a new trial in State vs. Winget, 
6 Utah 2d 243 310 P2d 738, stated: 
The sole question confronting us is whether evi· 
dence of other similar sex acts with persons other 
than the complaining witness is admissable ... 
such evidence is inadmissible in this state. 
Justice Wade's concurring opinion makes this ob· 
servation with his characteristic clarity: 
The potential danger that this evidence. woula 
cause undue prejudice, confuse the issues, ana 
mislead the jury is obvious ... the court abuseo 
its discretion inf ailing to exclude this evidence .on 
the grounds that the potential danger of preJU· 
dice far outweighs its substantive value. 
8 
ni POINT II 
0,1 THE COURT COMMITTED REYERSIBLE 
irt EHROR IK PERMITTING THE DISTRICT 
!nl ATTORNEY TO EXCEED THE BOUNDS OF 
id. PERMISSABLE CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
:al 
The District Attorney, when cross-examining the 
rn 
Appellant, exceeded the scope of permissable cross-ex-
amination by asking questions which assumed facts not 
bt in evidence and further by asking questions which were 
~X· compounded and argumentative. 
on The District Attorney, by the use of questions which 
In· exceeded the scope of direction examination and based 
iO. upon facts not in evidence, put to the jury his theory of 
in the case. Such cross-examination can be found in the 
et, transcript commencing at page 1683. Defense counsel 
objected to the questioning and a conference was con-
VI· ducted out of the presence of the jury by an alarmed 
1er judge who tried to limit and give objectivity to the Dis-
trict Attorney's questioning. ( T 1707-1708) 
Finally, defense counsel asked that the record re-
Jb· fleet his continuing objection ( T 1721). During the 
course of cross-examination, defense counsel, on no less 
than seven occasions, ( T 1689, 1716, 1719, 1721, 1722, 
~~ 1727, 1729) made objections to the District Attorney's 
ea questions which were each and all overruled, serving to 
on impress upon the jury that the questions propounded by 
Ill' the State's counsel were acceptable and the objections 
interposed by a protective defense attorney were to per-
mit recuperative analysis by a guilty witness. 
9 
A novice at trying criminal cases realizes the pro\1.1 
lems of int.erp~sing objections to a State's Attorney'11 
cross-exammation .. Most reason, unless the abuse is fla.i 
grant, that it appears to a jury that you are aiding or
1 
hiding a guilty witness and as a matter of strategy, little 
objecting tactically is appropriate. It was this rationalt 
that forced defense counsel to have the record reflect 
his continuing objection and then sit patiently while the I 
abuse continued. 1 
I 
A criminal defendant goes upon the stand under, 
cloud. He stands charged with a criminal offense and i1 
under the strongest possible temptation to give evidenct 
favorable to himself. His evidence is therefore lookeal 
upon with suspicion and distrust and if, in addition le: 
this, he may be subjected to cross-examination as Appel·f 
lant here was, he became so prejudiced in the minds oli 
I 
the jury as to induce them to convict upon statement-1 
made in the course of cross-examination, called questiom 
and not upon evidence. It is not legitimate cross-exam1·1 
nation to advance theories or bolster a weak case on spec I 
ulative and conjectural statements and then call then:I 
I 
questions. 
The cold record is vacant of the District Attornep 
demeanor when cross-examining, but the record doe; 
provide these illustrative samples: 
And when you took her there, and I mean Arn. 
Levanger, on that day, you had her put her bea~ 
down in the seat when you went through town-
( T 1706 lines 17-19) 
10 
And at that same time in that same place, Octo-
ber 10, 1969, between 7 :00 and 9 :00 p.m. you 
took States Exhibit 16, your topcoat, and you 
laid ihat on that sofa, didn't you? ( T 1716 lines 
1-4) 
And maybe that's the time that you got your 
sweater on the window sill because maybe when 
she came back and hit you with her head, as you 
were choking the life out of her, you fell on that 
window sill and got your sweater on it, maybe 
that is when it happened. (T 1719 lines 14-18) 
So you got her around this way (indicating) and 
picked her up and stepped backwards through 
the window and when you did that, isn't it a fact-
( T 1721 lines 4-6) 
All right. Now, isn't it a fact that you couldn't 
leave that body of Ann Levanger at your grand-
mother's house because they would connect it 
with you? ( T 1723 lines 13-15) 
Isn't it a fact that because you got worried about 
sliding into that gully and because your trans-
mission was giving you trouble that you decided 
you wouldn't go all the way up to the shaft and 
hide that girl's body in the shaft, so you took it 
out and put it in the sagebrush where it was 
found, isn't that a fact? ( T 1724, 1725 lines 27-2) 
I show you what has been marked State's Exhibit 
26 in this matter and received in evidence as a 
stick that was in the ligature around that girl's 
neck, and isn't it a fact that after you took her out 
of the car in the area that the body was found that 
then and there you put that stick in there because 
you wanted to be certain that the job was done? 
( T 1725 lines 24-30) 
No where in the record does the truth of these assumed 
11 
facts appear. The only mention of them is in the quei 
tions asked by the District Attorney and there, they wer1 
stated as matters of fact. Furthermore, neither proui 
nor off er of proof of such facts was made by the counst' 
for the State. From all that appears in the record, th1 
statements well might have been entirely a fiction ot 
counsel's imagination. 
I 
Justice Peek of the District Court of Appeal of thti 
. I 
Third District for California, in ilf cDonald vs. Price: 
181 P2d 115, 80 CA2d 150 ( 1947), states the ruleail 
follows: : 
I 
While a wide latitude should be given in cros1·! 
examinations, counsel in putting questions to thtj 
witness should not be allowed to assume facts no!; 
in evidence and state as positive assertions fact
1 which if true would be detrimental to the oppos·, 
ing party's case and of such a nature as to inflame' 
and prejudice the minds of the jurors .... The, 
inherent vice of the matter lies in the attempt to 
bring before the jury in a round about way facti 
which could not be proved and which from a~: 
appearances may have been entirely false. 
See also Buchanan vs. Nye, 128 CA2 582, 275 P2Ji 
767 ( 1954), and this comment by the Oklahoma Court: 
of Criminal Appeals in State vs. Davis 413 P2d 92~. 
( 1966) referring to its prior holding in Leeth vs. State.I 
94 Okla Cr. 61, 230 P2d 942, ' 
It is improper for the County Atto~ney ~o state, 
his personal opinion as to defendants gmlt or.t~ 
state facts not proved by evidence or otherw1st 
given before the jury, and ~vhich amounts .to hi: 
own opinion ... the only evidence offered m thi. 
12 
respect was that provided by the County Attor-
ney in the process of his cross-examination, which 
in substance amounted to his opinion. 
l is Appellant's contention that the State's Attor-
ney's procedure in his cross-examination of Appellant 
riolated Appellant's fundamental rights. The trial judge 
made one effort to stop and limit the cross-examination, 
but the trial court should have gone beyond such admo-
nition. See State vs. Bouse, 199 Or 676, 264 P2d 800 
(1953) ·where the Oregon Supreme Court said" ... The 
Court itself, in the intere,As of justice, should have taken 
action to stop it." 
The record in this case has improper, argumenta-
tive, and prejudicial questions assuming unproved facts 
asked by counsel for the State on cross-examination of 
Appellant-questions to which objections should have 
been sustained and stricken and the jury instructed to 
disregard them. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AD-
MITTING INTO EVIDENCE ITEMS SEIZED 
FROM APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE. 
'l'he trial counsel entered into a stipulation of fact 
relative to the manner in which the automobile was seized, 
the essence of which is found at T. P. 340-344. 
Historicallv an item could be seized pursuant to a . , 
ralid warrant or incidental to a lawful arrest. Quite 
13 
., 
apart from an arrest to justify a seizure without a war 
rant the State could secure the item by the consent of tn1 
party from whom it was seized. However, the consenr. 
must be given without express or implied duress. Tn1' 
State must never exceed the bounds of consent. In sud 
case there is no valid consent. I 
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruleu 
that consent to enter one's premises induced by mistakt 
or deception as to the police agents identity was not valia 
consent. Gould vs. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
The Court said as follows: 
The secret taking without force from the house or 
office of one suspected of crime and in his aO· 
sence of a paper belonging to him, having evi· 
dential value only by a representative of an: 
branch or subdivision of the Federal Governmeui 
violates the Constitutional guarantee against un· 
reasonable searches and seizures whether entrancr 
to such house or office be obtained by stealth or 
through social acquaintance of in the guise of a 
business call and whether the owner or not ~ 
present at the time of entry. 
In Gould, supra, the seizure was under direction 01 
a superior officer, as was the officer who obtained ilir 
appellant's car. The car would not have been obtaineil 
but for the deceit of the officer. 
The case law in this area appears limited but tht 
United States Supreme Court in Lewis vs. Unitel 
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), a more recent pronounce· 
ment would have struck down the search had the agent 
' 
14 
by his deceit acquired anything not contemplated by the 
appellant. 
It appears that the government in this case secured 
the consent of appellant through deception which is no 
consent at all and an unconstitutional trespass. 
It is interesting to note that the State did not have 
probable cause to seize the car until after the analysis of 
its content. Probable cause to seize must exist prior to 
the seizure and not be a justification for a seizure already 
made. 
Appellant's auto was not validly seized and any seiz-
ure was nonconsensual because of deception. The State 
should be denied use of such evidence and the appellant's 
motion to suppress should have been granted. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE SELEC-
TION OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS BY: 
(A) DISMISSING ONE JUROR ON ITS OWN 
:\IOTION FOR A CAUSE NOT FOUND IN THE 
UTAH STATUTES, AND (B) BY WRONG-
FULLY EXCLUDING A JUROR FROM THE 
PANEL, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE AP-
PELLANT OF THE IMPARTIAL JURY RE-
QUIRED BY T H E S IX TH AND FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
15 
Section 77 -30-16, Utah Code Annotated ( 195~ 
sets forth the challenges which may be exercised at tli1 
selection of a jury. That section celarly states that a cha! 
lenge for cause may be taken by either party ( empha~c 
added). Further, that Section of the Utah statutes di 
vides the challenges for cause into general and particu 
lar challegnes. Section 77-30-18, Utah Code Annotate( 
( 1953) sets forth the particular grounds for challenge 
which are of two kinds: when the juror is shown to Oi 
biased or, when he is shown to be partial. 
In Volume I, page 160 of the transcript, on line I: 
the Court stated: 
The Court is of the opinion, in view of the la~ 
answer and statement of Mr. Knotts, that hi 
could not and would not under any circumstance 
return a verdict of the death penalty, recommend 
ing the death penalty, that he should be excuser 
as a juror in this case. That will be the order an1 
the clerk will draw another juror. Mr. Knott! 
you will be excused from further service in thi 
case. 
Counsel for the defense objected to the Court's dismis1 
ing l\fr. Knotts on its own motion. Transcript, Volum 
I, page 160, line 24: 
For the record, I wonder if we might enter a 
objection to Mr. Knotts being excused on behal 
of°the defense, that no challenges were made. ~n 
Court: Yes, the record will show your objectioJ 
While it is the generally accepted rule that the CoUI 
in selecting the veniremen sits as a tryer of fact on issui 
of challenges, See, e.g., State vs. JVilliams, 182 Kai 
16 
' i~[ J68, 322 P .2d 726 ( 1958), our code does not give the 
tn1
1 
Court the right to challenge on its own motion, nor does 
al\ the inherent power of the Court in selecting the venire-
1sc! extend to those lengths. The statute as quoted above 
dii~rovides that a challenge for cause may be made by 
~u 1 either party, and the statutes as quoted above indicate 
:eel1 the grounds on which such challenges may be based. 
5ei Therefore, the Court in acting on its own motion vio-
IJtl lated Appellant's right to a fair and impartial selection 
1 
of a jury guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and the 
i/ Ctah statutes. 
The transcript reveals in Volume I, pages 159 and 
ait 160, that the Court went to considerable lengths to dis-
ht cuss with the prospective juror Knotts whether or not 
ce! }fr. Knotts could recommend a death penalty. Section 








If the offense charged is punishable with death, 
the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as 
would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; 
m1
1 
would be the basis for a challenge for cause. That statu-
tory subsection on close scrutiny provides a basis for 
a challenge for cause only when the conscientious 
an 
13u scruples prohibit the prospective juror from deciding 
[b1 the issue of guilt or innocence. This question was not 
on asked of Mr. Knotts by the Court, nor was the informa-
un lion volunteered. Rather, the Court questioned only 
uB 1rhether or not Mr. Knotts could bring in a death pen-
an alty recommendation. The inability to recommend a 
I • 
' 17 
sentence of death is not a ground for a challenge fo. , 
cause in the State of Utah. 
The legislature has clearly designed the challeng~ 
for cause in section 77-30-19 Utah Code Annotate,, 
( 1953) so as to guarantee the selection of unbiased an~I 
impartial jurors. The legislature did not attempt, how.'i 
ever, to exclude those jurors whose tendency would 011 
toward lenient treatment of one convicted of a crime. 
The Court, in acting as it did in this case, engrafte~ 
by judicial act the requirement that prospective juror1 
with a lenient attitude on sentencing be excluded. Tnr 
systematic denial of lenient jurors as practiced by tbr 
Court in the case of prospective juror Knotts, clear!) 
denied the Appellant his constitutional right of due 
process. A juror may be excluded only for bias or par·•, 
tiality, not for attitudes of leniency. Thus, the Courlj 
may have, by excluding .Mr. Knotts, excluded the one 
individual who would have saved Redford from a dealt 
penalty sentence. That this possibility may have oc·, 
curred requires that the matter be remanded for a new\ 
trial with a properly selected jury. I 
The Court's improper exclusion of the juror Knott 
using as a reason Knotts' confessed inability to recom· 
mend a death sentence, invalidated the entire panel ol 
ventiremen. Although the jurisdictions are not in accorJ., 
Appellant submits the basic principle of Witherspoon 
vs. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, (1970) was violated by the 
witness Knotts exclusion. 
In Marion vs. Beto, 434 F2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970) 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit treated a 
18 
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fo: case similar to one at bar. In that case, the Texas 
, prisoner appealed a denial of habeas corpus relief main-
:~ latning that the trial court excluded jurors who voiced 
eu, conscientious scruples against the death penalty. The 
n~I Court noted that the bare question to be decided was 
I 
11·1 whether the improper exclusion for cause of a rela-
o:I tively small number of the total number of veniremen 
k questioned on grounds of mere conscientious scruples 
e~ against the death penalty, deprived the defendant of 
1r1 the impartial jury required by the sixth and fourteenth 
ne amendments. In Marion, the Court examined some of 
hr the cases which have held that an improper exclusion 
·I) of a few jurors does not constitute a violation of the 
ue Witherspoon doctrine. See, e.g., Bell vs. Patterson, 402 
tr·: F2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968); Pittman vs. State, 434 SW 
ITlj 352; Scott V8. State, 434 SW2d 678. 
ne The Court then concluded that the "magnitude of 
It a decision to take a human life" was so great * * * 
IC· ~ 11 \' It really does not follow that the improper exclu-sion of a relatively small number of the total 
:t 
D· 
1 veniremen examined does not prejudice the de-




The Court further stated: 
\Vhere, as here, unanimity of decision is required 
to impose the death sentence, stark reality is that 
one improperly excluded juror may mean the 
difference between life or death for a defendant. 
The Marion case was reversed and remanded to 
J,1 the District Court, State of Texas, with the options to 
a either resentence the defendant to a sentence not to 
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exceed life or to vacate the Appellant's conviction a 
sentence, and retry him. 
The Appellant submits that the improper exclusio 
of Mr. Knotts operated as a substantial prejudice agai 
him and tainted the entire panel. Although a proper! 
impaneled jury could still return a <leath penalty, , 
exclusion of even one juror is prejudical in a capit 
case. On this ground, Appellant urges that his con~~ 
tion be reversed and that the case be sent back to 
District Court for a new trial with a properly select 
JUry. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant requests a reversal of the judgment 
and verdict rendered below and the granting of a ne1 
trial on the grounds heretofore set forth. That the A~ 
pellant was denied a fair tial, resulting in the jury1 
granting him the death penalty because of the exclusio~ 
of a juror who had conscientious scruples against ~1 
death penalty; for the admission of highly prejudiciru 
evidence, that is, the testimony of Linda I vie; the eii· 
dence improperly obtained from Appellant's vehicle; 
and the manner in which Appellant was subjected to 
cross-examination. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT YAN SCIYER 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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